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From Dialogue to Broader Societal Change in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Our vision is a world beyond war by 2030 and humanity united by a global system of peace with justice.

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Peace and Conflict Studies (henceforth: Peace Science) has emerged as an academic discipline with its own graduate programs, handbooks, research tools, theories, associations, journals, and conferences. As with most scientific communities, the slow migration of academic knowledge into practical application becomes a limiting factor of a field’s growth, its impact, and the overall effectiveness of its practitioners.

The expanding academic field of Peace Science continues to produce high volumes of significant research that often goes unnoticed by practitioners, the media, activists, public policy-makers, and other possible beneficiaries. This is unfortunate, because Peace Science ultimately should inform the practice on how to bring about peace.

*The research and theory needed to guide peace workers to produce more enduring and positive peace, not only more peace studies, have come to stay. Bridging the gap between the peace movement moralism and foreign policy pragmatism is a major challenge facing everyone who seeks to achieve peace on Earth. (Johan Galtung and Charles Webel)*

To address this issue, the War Prevention Initiative has created the *Peace Science Digest* as a way to disseminate top selections of research and findings from the field’s academic community to its many beneficiaries.

The *Peace Science Digest* is formulated to enhance awareness of scholarship addressing the key issues of our time by making available an organized, condensed, and comprehensible summary of this important research as a resource for the practical application of the field’s current academic knowledge.
LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

Dear Readers,

What people believe matters. It matters, most crucially, to decisions about how to act. We all must make sense of the world before we can act in it and on it. Is it possible to shift beliefs, particularly those that condone the use of violence or embrace exclusionary or dehumanizing ideals?

What people believe can also have real consequences on policy. As noted in "Threats, Public Support, and Military Intervention," beliefs about threats—and what constitutes an appropriate response to them—can shape decisions to participate in military intervention. In the case of militant groups ("Diaspora Support for Militant Groups Contributes to a Shift Towards Nonviolence"), beliefs about the best tactics and strategy to use in pursuit of their goals can be influenced by diaspora support. Finally, beliefs about who was victimized by sexual violence in war can have implications for accountability mechanisms, as well as for victim support and civilian protection efforts going forward. In "Uncovering the Extent and Nature of Sexual Violence in Wartime Sri Lanka," a novel research method challenges our preconceptions about who the primary victims were.

Peace science offers insights into how some interventions can instigate a change of beliefs. In this issue, we feature two articles that show how facilitated dialogue can be used as a tool to transform beliefs and have those beliefs translate into concerted action against exclusionary policies. In "Sharing Family Photos Elicits Inter-Group Dialogue Among Arabs and Israelis," the author brought together a group of Israelis and Palestinians and used an educational technique called photomonologues to encourage the group to find commonalities and break down barriers among them. In "From Dialogue to Broader Societal Change in Bosnia-Herzegovina," participants in a dialogue program built on the trust and understanding developed there to engage in joint activism in their communities—in particular, activism aimed at overcoming institutionalized ethnic divisions.

Reading these analyses also encourages us to reflect on our own belief systems and the knowledge we bring to the conversation. How might these lessons confirm our own existing beliefs or challenge our assumptions? Relatedly, how might our beliefs inform how we act or how we participate in our own communities or government?

You Peace Science Digest Editorial Team,
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In democratic societies, one would assume—or at least hope—that the opinions of an informed public would have an impact on their governments’ decision-making about whether to initiate military action based on perceived threats. The relationship between military action, public opinion, and threats is at the core of this study. Who follows whom: is the voice of the public constraining military intervention, do governments use their public relations efforts to manipulate the public in favor of intervening, or are citizens and decision-makers equally inclined to react to threats to national interests with a call for military action? It depends on the context of the intervention.

There is an extensive body of research looking at the public opinion/foreign policy nexus. According to the author, there are disconnected strands of existing scholarship that look at either whether public opinion shapes foreign policy decisions or whether governments are able to influence public opinion to advance their interests. In this study, the author tries to bridge the gap by connecting the strands in a single analysis.

To examine the relationship, the author looked at the behaviors of EU member states in two military operations: 1) the 2011 intervention in Libya, and 2) the operation against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq. The research methodology of coincidence analysis allowed for a systematic comparison across the cases while accounting for the complexities within. While the military operations had degrees of similarities, the main differences were the stated humanitarian goal in the case of Libya and the goal of protecting national interests by preventing the creation of an international terrorism safe haven in the case of targets in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the operation in Libya was authorized by the UN Security Council, whereas the fight against ISIS was carried out by an ad hoc coalition.

In the case of Libya, EU member states’ use of force was constrained by public opinion. In other words, “public opinion was decisive for participation in the Libya intervention.” In the few countries where public opinion was not decisive, contextual circumstances helped explain inconsistencies with the general findings. Italy, for example, which is close to Libya both geographically and economically, reluctantly
participated in air strikes despite the lack of public support only when it became clear that Gaddafi would lose power. Portugal, which was in the midst of a domestic political crisis, did not participate in military action despite public support for doing so. In the case of the anti-ISIS coalition, the analysis revealed that perceived threats caused both public support and military action. EU member states perceived a clear threat to their interests, which was enough for them to get involved in military action. The aggressive intentions of ISIS and the presence of foreign fighters made the threat tangible to the populations and thus also generated public support for military operations. In cases such as Sweden and Germany, constitutional restrictions, namely domestic legal rules, prevented the nations from participating in those operations.

The results show that the context is decisive for the relationship between public support, military action, and threat. Whether public opinion acts as a constraint on military action depends on the primary objective and whether there are clear and tangible national interests at stake.

In the context of the Libya operation, there were no aggressive intentions by the regime against the countries in question. Less tangible threats to national interests in Libya resulted in domestic conditions and public opinion acting as a constraint when it came to participation in military action. In the context of the ISIS operation, clear and tangible threats led to public support and military action independent from each other.

As the author concludes, “whether public opinion is a constraint on military action or an effect of threats strongly depends on the primary objective of the military operation and whether or not the threats to a state’s national interests are clear and tangible.”
TALKING POINTS

In the context of EU member state decisions about whether to participate in military action either in Libya (2011) or against ISIS in Iraq and Syria (starting in 2014),

- Less tangible threats to national interests resulted in domestic conditions and public opinion acting as a constraint when it came to participation in military action (in the case of Libya).
- Clear and tangible threats led to public support and military action independent from each other (in the case of anti-ISIS military operations).
- “Whether public opinion is a constraint on military action or an effect of threats strongly depends on the primary objective of the military operation and whether or not the threats to a state’s national interests are clear and tangible.”

Photo Credit: Manuel Alvarez from Pixabay.
INFORMING PRACTICE

This study contributes to knowledge about the interplay between threats, public opinion, and military action. Its finding that the specific context of a military intervention—particularly its objective and the extent to which there are “clear and tangible” threats posed to national interests—influences whether public support acts as a constraint on decisions to use military force is instructive. It tells us that campaigns to inform public opinion about the shortcomings of military action will be more decisive in cases where there are no direct threats to national interests.

It is also worthwhile, however, to ask what assumptions are being made in this research—as well as by political leaders and the public—about what constitutes an appropriate response to direct threats when these are present. It is taken for granted, for instance, that when there is a direct threat to national interests, military action is a necessary and effective response that will ultimately safeguard these national interests. If we are to make any headway in preventing the knee-jerk reaction of military intervention when national interests are at stake, we must address these assumptions head on.

First, the immediate context of possible military action and those conducting it needs to be thoroughly analyzed through a conflict mapping framework. A systematic deconstruction of all possible variables does not only help separate seemingly obvious positions from interests and underlying needs. It also sheds light on the many complexities of a conflict within its historical context. In the cases shown in this study, conflict mapping then would include an examination of the 2011 uprising in Libya in the context of the Arab Spring and the underlying grievances that led to the rise of ISIS, respectively. Both cases then can be viewed through a lens of conflict transformation that includes many viable nonviolent alternatives to military action. The latter, as we know from other research presented in the Peace Science Digest, is often an ineffective and counterproductive tool for countering terrorism, as it fuels grievances of already marginalized communities, feeding into narratives employed by terrorist groups and providing these groups with new recruits. Conflict resolution or peacebuilding approaches to confronting terrorism take the broader historical, political, and socio-economic context into consideration and include engaging in dialogue with members of terrorist organizations and the communities that support them, addressing legitimate grievances of these actors, and countering the alienation felt by those on the margins of society.

Second, discussions and decisions about military intervention take place within a larger context of militarism, where in a society war and preparation for war dominate politics and foreign policy. Our own security, in this context, can only be maintained by military force. A demilitarization of security entails several strategies including the promotion of nonviolent norms and alternatives to military intervention, a reconfiguration of the responses to terrorism, the creation of a peace economy, gender equality, and disarmament efforts. Advocacy organizations such as World Beyond War, Peace Action, or Win Without War push for such systemic changes and can help transform the militaristic narratives around threats underlying the militarized security paradigm.

Finally, when we are able to connect the case-specific and broader context analyses to the role of public opinion and war support, other research found that when people are aware of nonviolent alternatives to war, they are less likely to tolerate casualties and support war. Awareness can be created through informed peace activism, advocacy with elected officials, public education, and media engagement, among other approaches.

Diaspora Support for Militant Groups Contributes to a Shift Towards Nonviolence

In Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) pursued an armed rebellion and independence campaign against the British, reaching its height of violence in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, violence declined into the 1990s, and the IRA relied less on violent tactics and started to incorporate more nonviolent approaches. By 1998, the Good Friday Agreement was reached, and a peace process started in Northern Ireland. This strategic shift towards nonviolence on the part of the IRA, or at least the incorporation of more nonviolent tactics, is witnessed in several other (formerly) armed resistance movements around the world—like Fatah in the Palestinian Territories, the Umma Liberation Party in Sudan, or the African National Congress in South Africa. What can explain a strategic shift towards nonviolence by militant groups?

This research focuses on external support for militant groups as a contributing factor for why they might shift towards nonviolence. Specifically, the author looks at external support (which can include financial support, arms, or technical training and capacity) from foreign governments and the diaspora. She finds that the probability of militant groups adopting nonviolence increases by 7% when diaspora support is present. Support from foreign governments, however, does not appear to influence the use of nonviolence.

Looking at external support for militant groups is important because, as the author points out, “domestic conflict rarely remains isolated from external influence.” Who provides that support is also important because the militant group “finds itself in a binding position to its benefactor since its future actions are dependent on the supply of support.” This creates a dynamic where external supporters seek to advance their own interests in the context of an armed struggle, whether that is an interest in the continuation of violence or an interest in the cessation of hostilities. For militant groups, this support might be necessary to continue operations but also risky, as it may alienate domestic support.

Continuing with the example from Northern Ireland, Muammar Gaddafi, former leader of Libya, was a key foreign supporter of the IRA during

Diaspora Support for Militant Groups
Contributes to a Shift Towards Nonviolence

Keywords
diaspora, nonviolence, militant groups, external support

the height of violence in the 1970s. He was motivated to support what he saw as an anti-colonial struggle and undermine the British government, thus he saw support for the IRA as an advancement of his broad political interests. However, the Irish diaspora in the United States was a key supporter of the move towards nonviolence, advocating for a peaceful resolution to the conflict both with the U.S. government (who was a key broker in the Good Friday Agreement) and with the IRA (whose shift to nonviolent tactics was critical). The Irish diaspora had opposing interests to Gaddafi’s, wanting to see an end of hostilities in Northern Ireland.

Yet, the IRA in Northern Ireland is just one example. In order to test the association between foreign support and a shift to nonviolent tactics, the author used the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset, which contains data on 250 violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1945 to 2006, and developed a unique dataset that tested the adoption of nonviolence, measured by the use of civil resistance and/or participation in elections, against whether or not there was material support from foreign states or diaspora communities. This article shows that the IRA is not alone as a recipient of external support. Half of militant groups receive support from the diaspora and close to 60% receive support from foreign governments.

While the author found that diaspora support increased the likelihood of a shift towards nonviolence, this shift only took place in 6% of the cases observed in the dataset, meaning that it is a rare event. However, support from the diaspora was a statistically significant factor in adopting nonviolent tactics, whereas support from foreign governments did not seem to affect militant groups’ tactical decisions. The author explains that cultural ties between the diaspora and militant groups can help to explain this effect. Previous research in conflict mediation suggests that “biased” mediators are more successful in reducing conflict. Similarly, diasporas are “biased” in this context, as they may share the same cultural norms and identities as militant groups, providing them with some measure of influence as they try to move military groups towards nonviolent tactics.

Continued reading:


Organizations/Initiatives:
Diasporas for Peace: https://www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=1407
Nonviolent Action, USIP: https://www.usip.org/issue-areas/nonviolent-action
TALKING POINTS

- Diaspora support for militant groups is associated with a 7% increased probability that the militant group will shift towards nonviolent tactics.
- External support for militant groups is important to consider because domestic conflicts are rarely isolated from external influence, but who provides that support can influence how militant groups act.
- External support from the diaspora, compared to foreign governments, may be better at influencing a shift towards nonviolent tactics because of shared cultural ties.

Photo Credit: Diego Lopez. Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC 2.0) Peace Wall Belfast.
INFORMING PRACTICE

The previous Special Issue of the Peace Science Digest focused on refugees and migrants. One research article summarized in that issue, under the title “Refugee Resettlement as a Form of Transnational Peacebuilding,” argued that refugee resettlement is a form of peacebuilding because refugees support peacebuilding activities in their countries of origin through remittances and transfer of social capital. Further, refugees are an under-appreciated source of expertise on peacebuilding in their countries of origin because they are viewed as passive victims rather than agents of change. A similar case can be made for members of the diaspora (of which refugees are certainly a part)—they present an untapped resource of cultural knowledge and connections that can be used to transform conflict dynamics.

This insight creates new opportunities and pathways for influencing nonviolent action in conflict-affected contexts through engagement with members of the diaspora. This research identified sharing technical capacity as one option of external support for militant groups. This technical support could include training and resources on nonviolent action and the effectiveness of nonviolent action in the face of state repression. For instance, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) offers training and educational resources on nonviolent action and movement building. Providing training or working with members of the diaspora to transmit these lessons could be a valuable approach to indirectly influencing the decision-making processes of militant groups world-wide.

Yet, this approach also carries risks, as external support for militant groups could qualify as foreign support for terrorism, which could put any assisting non-profit or non-governmental organization in serious legal trouble. For these organizations or funders looking to transform conflict dynamics, working with the diaspora from a conflict-affected country without directly engaging militant groups in an armed conflict could be a smart approach to avoiding these risks and effectively advancing the message of nonviolence, as members of the diaspora can better package this knowledge within existing cultural norms and expectations. Further, this approach helps to shift the narratives around those who flee or are forced to flee from conflict—rather than victims, they are powerful actors capable of influencing key conflict parties and encouraging peaceful outcomes in their countries of origin.

Uncovering the Extent and Nature of Sexual Violence in Wartime Sri Lanka


Keywords

Sri Lanka, sexual violence, civil war, gender, research methodology, list experiment, LTTE

Although sexual violence is known to be a common weapon of war, it remains difficult to establish its occurrence in specific contexts due to underreporting. This silence around sexual violence can stem from victims’ feelings of shame or guilt or from a well-founded fear of stigmatization or repression, especially when the perpetrators remain in power. In particular, Sri Lanka is a context where there has been uncertainty about the extent of sexual violence in that country’s civil war (1983-2009) between the Sinhalese-majority-controlled government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, the primary armed group fighting for a Tamil homeland), though recent reports indicate that sexual violence may have been systematic and asymmetric. Accordingly, the authors examine the “scope, distribution, and determinants of sexual violence” during the Sri Lankan civil war, using a research method intended to overcome some of the anticipated underreporting: a list experiment.

Rather than ask respondents directly whether they experienced sexual violence during the war, this list experiment presented individuals with a list of items and asked *how many—not which*—of these they experienced during the war. One group of respondents received a list that included three items, none of which had to do with sexual violence, resulting in a numerical response between 0 and 3. The other group of respondents received the same list but with an additional item about whether they personally experienced sexual assault, resulting in a numerical response between 0 and 4. By comparing the higher average number of the second group with the lower average number of the first group, the authors were able to determine the percentage of respondents who experienced sexual violence during the war—the only difference between the two lists that could have accounted for the different numerical averages. The list experiment was embedded in a broader face-to-face survey of Sri Lankans across the country in 2016 (1,800 respondents total) that also asked direct questions about whether individuals experienced or witnessed sexual assault. Additionally, the survey gathered respondents’ demographic information, along with information on whether respondents had been displaced or had assisted and/or participated in the military or other armed group during the war.
A few key findings stand out. First, the list experiment reveals that sexual violence was in fact much more prevalent than direct questioning would suggest, with about 13.4% of the population estimated to have experienced sexual violence during the war, compared to 1.4% of the population when direct questioning is used. Second, comparing the list experiment results with those from the direct questions reveals which groups are most vulnerable to sexual violence, as well as which groups are most hesitant to report these experiences. For instance, non-combatants who assisted the military or other armed groups were the most vulnerable to sexual violence, at about 42%, though only 3% reported personal experience with sexual violence in the direct question. Additionally, although it is widely assumed that women are more vulnerable to sexual violence than men, 20% of men are estimated to have experienced sexual violence compared to 9% of women, though only 0.8% of men and 1.8% of women admit to experiencing wartime sexual violence in response to the direct question.

Third, digging deeper into the relationships between variables like ethnicity, armed group assistance, gender, and displacement, the authors provide support for more specific determinants of wartime sexual violence in the Sri Lanka—though their victim-centered data can provide only indirect support for claims about the perpetrators or their intentions. In particular, 52% of Tamils who assisted armed groups (presumably the LTTE or associated Tamil armed groups) experienced sexual violence, compared to 20% of non-Tamil supporters of the military/armed groups and 11% of Tamils who did not support armed groups. Additionally, although men and women among the non-displaced population experienced sexual violence at roughly equal levels (12% and 14%, respectively), among those who were displaced, men had a much higher rate of sexual violence at 31% as opposed to 10% for women. Taken together, these findings support the argument that government forces “perpetrated sexual violence asymmetrically and strategically against collaborators of the LTTE” as they were fleeing the war zone to “coerce confessions, degrade suspects, and discourage broader Tamil involvement with the LTTE.” Although the finding on the higher rate of sexual violence against displaced men runs counter to expectations, it makes sense in light of the fact that men would be more likely to be seen by government forces as potential LTTE collaborators.

In sum, this research provides compelling evidence for the value of list experiments as a means for uncovering sensitive information such as wartime sexual violence—with troubling findings on the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war in the Sri Lankan case.

Continued reading:


Organizations/Initiatives:

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1. The way the list experiment and direct questions were worded, this sexual violence could include domestic violence perpetrated during the war as well as more directly war-related sexual violence at the hands of armed actors.
TALKING POINTS

In the context of the Sri Lankan civil war,

- A list experiment is an effective research method for uncovering sensitive information, as its use suggests that sexual violence was much more prevalent during the Sri Lankan civil war (affecting about 13.4% of the population) than direct questioning would indicate (at 1.4% of the population).
- 52% of Tamils who assisted armed groups experienced sexual violence, compared to 20% of non-Tamil supporters of the military/armed groups and 11% of Tamils who did not support armed groups, suggesting that government forces “perpetrated sexual violence asymmetrically and strategically against collaborators of the LTTE.”
- Despite a roughly equal rate of sexual violence among men and women in the general population (12% and 14%, respectively), among displaced Sri Lankans, men had a much higher rate of sexual violence at 31% as opposed to 10% for women, suggesting that sexual violence was employed mostly against men with suspected LTTE ties as they were fleeing the war zone.

Photo Credit: Tokkinochchi. Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0)

Jan 2009 displacement in the Vanni. Civilians are being displaced from parts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts as a result of the Sri Lanka Army’s military offensive. There are 350,000 displaced persons in the Vanni. The Govt of SL ordered the UN & international NGOs to leave the area in Sept 2008.
INFORMING PRACTICE

A few insights from this research stand out for war and violence prevention. First, this research highlights the political and ethical implications of methodological choices. With a sensitive subject such as sexual violence, it matters how researchers seek out information. Different research methodologies will get very different results: whereas a direct survey question about sexual violence may lead researchers to conclude that sexual violence was not very prevalent in a particular context, a list experiment—which does not require respondents to directly reveal their experience with sexual violence—is likely to reveal a more accurate estimation of its prevalence. And this knowledge can then lead to policy changes and calls for greater accountability on the part of perpetrators. This serves as a useful reminder not only to other academic researchers but also to organizations in the field carrying out their own research to inform programming that careful deliberations must go into research design—and that a list experiment may serve as a helpful methodological tool in some cases.

Second, the finding that displaced men were sexually assaulted at a much higher rate than displaced women has important policy implications and should lead organizations and policy-makers to re-examine their own assumptions about women being the prime targets of sexual assault. As Charli Carpenter highlights in her work on gendered assumptions about vulnerability in the context of the Bosnian War, not critically examining these assumptions can have grave implications, as it did in Srebrenica where the emphasis on protecting women and children left men at greater risk for the massacre that eventually took place. Of course, the distribution of vulnerability among genders will vary from one context to another, but the present research serves as a useful reminder that organizations should employ inclusive language and practices in their protection work and in their work with sexual assault survivors in particular, so that all genders find their services accessible. In short, organizations and policy-makers should remember that gender-informed programming entails, among other things, attention to the different experiences of various genders, not just attention to the experiences of women, though of course that remains vitally important.

Third, it is worth noting that any “power” sexual assault may have over its victims—especially its male victims—it gains from patriarchy. The “feminizing” or “emasculating” effect of sexual assault is particularly potent as a form of degradation—beyond the obvious physical pain and harm entailed—only in a world where gender hierarchies are firmly entrenched. Therefore, key to the effort to limit the use of sexual violence in wartime is a dismantling of this hierarchy where being “feminized” is experienced as an insult. The research finding on the high prevalence of sexual violence against men but the extremely low rate at which men report it (in the direct survey question) provides a striking illustration of these patriarchal forces at work—and the powerful silencing effect these can have especially on men who face a great deal of pressure to appear virulently masculine. As a start in countering these forces, perhaps the revelation of the widespread prevalence of wartime sexual violence among both men and women—at least in the Sri Lankan context—can create space for this experience to be destigmatized and discussed.
Sharing Family Photos Elicits Inter-Group Dialogue Among Arabs and Israelis

Keywords
Israel/Palestine, migration, peace education, dialogue, peacebuilding

“We all come from homes that have experienced significant pain involving migration. [...] There is no real discourse in Israel about this, not many opportunities [to sit] in the same room talking—she about her Palestinian roots, me about my European roots.”

This quotation is from a participant in a series of workshops using photo-monologues and photo-dialogues to elicit discussion on belonging, uprooting, and migration. These are educational techniques that, through participants’ selection and presentation of family photos, encourage the blending of personal and political experiences, offering insight into different interpretations of historical events by those who experienced them. The author argues that the use of family photos, rather than official documentations of atrocities, does more to “reduce distances and bring people closer.”

These photo-monologues and photo-dialogues were conducted over the course of four voluntary workshops among six female college students in arts and education in Israel. Two of the six were Arab—one Christian and one Muslim—and the remaining four were Jewish, one of Ashkenazi origin and the rest of mixed Ashkenazi-Mizrahi origin. This represented a spectrum of ethnic and religious identities in Israel.

Employing photo-monologue and photo-dialogue techniques in Israel presents an opportunity both to “empathize with the suffering of others” across a range of ethnic and religious identities and to “archive alternative public histories.” In Israel, the official history curriculum selectively incorporates the theme of migration, excluding narratives of Mizrahi migrants and Palestinian refugees as part of an overall Eurocentric educational curriculum. Namely, the founding of the Israeli state is tied closely with the Holocaust and the influx of Jewish refugees from Europe in the late 1940s and 50s. Yet, the official curriculum excludes the Palestinian narrative which associates the establishment of the Israeli state with the “Nakba” (meaning catastrophe) wherein 700,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled from their ancestral homes and villages. Further, the migration of Mizrahi Jews is reported to be marginalized in the official curriculum by treating Mizrahi migration as adjunct to these events, entrenching the Eurocentric telling of history.

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1. Ashkenazi and Mizrahi are two sub-populations of the Jewish diaspora. The Ashkenazi diaspora settled throughout Europe whereas the Mizrahi diaspora settled throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Both diaspora groups emigrated to Israel following its statehood in 1948. Some Mizrahi populations were forced or fled to Israel from predominately Muslim countries.
From the photo-dialogue workshops, the author identified three common themes across the presentations and discussions.

First, the trauma of migration was central to discussions, especially how it formed either an idealized past or an idealized future for the subject of the family photo. For stories that featured Holocaust survivors, migration to Israel and life thereafter were associated with happiness and hope. However, both Mizrahi Jewish and Palestinian presenters associated life before migration with happiness, with the subsequent migration to (Mizrahi) and from (Palestinians) Israel associated with pain and nostalgia.

Second, almost each of the presenters selected a photograph of her grandfather, noting that her grandfather’s migration narrative was central to the family’s narrative. For Palestinians, the grandfather figure represented “perseverance and adaption” and called for peace despite childhood experiences with war. For Jewish presenters, the grandfather represented a tragic figure who absorbed the pain of his past experiences and migration trauma to integrate into Israeli society.

Third, the themes of shame, concealment, and silencing were particularly prominent in the Palestinian and Mizrahi Jewish presenters. Mizrahi presenters described shame in their parents’ and grandparents’ identity crises following migration to Israel. They felt that they were treated as lesser than the European Ashkenazi Israelis. For Palestinians, their stories of the Nakba revealed “the huge gap between the Israeli curriculum and the Palestinians’ stories of migration, of which the Jewish students were completely ignorant.”

Participating in photo-dialogues led the participants to see their shared history of trauma associated with migration to/from Israel, albeit through dramatically different contexts and circumstances. Participants experienced critical breakthroughs, questioning the “unfounded hatred for the other side” and lack of engagement between Arab and Jewish communities prior to college. In conclusion, the author notes that this technique elevates the need to encourage personal-political discourse that involves a critical review of official education curriculum. Importantly, the use of family photos helps to reveal marginalized historical knowledge as an alternative to official narratives.

Organizations/Initiatives:
Sadaka-Reut: http://www.reutsadaka.org
Just Vision: https://www.justvision.org
Active Stills: https://www.activestills.org
TALKING POINTS

• Photo-monologues and photo-dialogues were a useful educational tool to help Israeli and Palestinian students empathize with each other over shared familial trauma associated with migration to or from Israel.
• Migration is an important theme in the official education curriculum in Israel, but this curriculum emphasizes a Eurocentric view that marginalizes Mizrahi Jewish and Palestinian migration narratives.
• Photo-monologues and photo-dialogues drawing on family photos present “alternative public histories” that challenge official narratives on migration and help participants “reduce barriers” among various ethnic and religious identities in Israel.

Photo Credit:
Students: Arabs and Jews, religious and secular from various colleges in the course summary from TEL.
INFORMING PRACTICE

Photo-monologues and photo-dialogues are one example of innovative approaches to interpersonal and intercommunal peacebuilding in deeply entrenched conflicts. In contexts like Israel and Palestine, where decades of conflict have alienated these communities, local approaches to peacebuilding can begin to challenge pre-conceived ideas and stereotypes that would otherwise inhibit dialogue between these groups. This is a particularly important task when official narratives on historical events advance an exclusive interpretation, rather than one that encompasses multiple sides of a given conflict. Jewish participants in these workshops reported no previous experience learning about the Palestinian forced migration (the Nakba). It wasn’t just exposure to Palestinian narratives of forced migration but the presentation of it through family photos that helped to bring participants of various ethnic and religious identities together. Sharing similar stories of migration and trauma helps to build a common understanding among participants.

As powerful as this example is, it is important to note incredibly disproportionate power dynamics between participants of various ethnic or religious identities in Israel. Helping to break down pre-conceived beliefs or stereotypes about the “other” is necessary to building peace but it does not, in and of itself, address the thorny political issues at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indirectly, efforts like these can begin to transform attitudes and beliefs that drive support for militarized solutions to the conflict. Within Israel, results of a series of elections this past year suggest deepening disagreement over the future direction of the country. The incumbent and conservative Likud Party, with Benjamin Netanyahu at the helm, failed to win a clear majority of the vote or achieve a governing coalition. The more moderate Blue and White Party, led by Benny Gantz, is mounting a considerable challenge to Likud Party rule, drawing a tie in the recent election. This loss for Likud came after Netanyahu promised to annex an additional 30% of the West Bank as a “security measure.” As this was a promise likely made to mobilize support, a possible interpretation of the Likud Party’s loss can be growing skepticism of an overtly militarized approach to security—skepticism that continued support for local peacebuilding initiatives can help to cultivate.
Dialogue is a common tool employed in post-war settings to promote reconciliation between antagonistic groups. The primary focus of such efforts is usually individual-level attitude changes and interpersonal relationship-building. Indeed, research on dialogue has documented its ability to bring about “an increased sense of commonalities, recognition of multiple perspectives... enhanced empathy..., mutual trust,” and so on. But the hope is also that these individual and interpersonal changes will then translate into societal-level transformation. Little research has, however, assessed whether and how dialogue can accomplish this second task. Accordingly, the author of this research is interested in investigating the outcomes of a particular dialogue project—run by the Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC) Sarajevo—and whether it has been able to initiate broader changes at the societal level in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).

The approach to dialogue employed by the NDC Sarajevo (“Nansen dialogue”) is oriented around three concepts: movement, visibility, and relations. Both physical and mental movement are needed for successful dialogue: the physical movement to neutral ground for the dialogue itself and eventually across societal divisions when taking joint action, and the mental movement occurring when participants listen to one another with openness. Participants make themselves visible to one another by telling their own and listening to each other's stories. Mutual relations are strengthened through the understanding that dialogue engenders, even if disagreement persists. Ultimately, the goal of Nansen dialogue is to “transform antagonistic relations that prevail in ethnically divided communities into functional political and social relations.” This goal presents a real challenge in contemporary BiH where social and political institutions are still often organized around and segregated by ethnicity. NDC Sarajevo invites participants to an initial weekend-long dialogue seminar at the end of which they are encouraged to identify problems related to ethnic divisions in their communities and devise action plans to address these. NDC Sarajevo provides follow-up in the form of financial and technical support for these projects, as well as advanced trainings.

There were two phases to the author’s research. First, in fall 2012, she interviewed 22 individuals, including NDC dialogue participants from four rural locales, NDC staff, and the lead NDC facilitator, while also observing one week-long dialogue. Second, in summers 2016 and 2017, she followed...
up with focus groups and interviews with NDC staff and alumni members of the Nansen Coordination Boards (NCBs), the entities set up by former participants to coordinate community-based inter-ethnic projects. To determine the extent to which NDC’s projects have contributed to broader societal change, the author applied the following Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) evaluation criteria: whether a project reaches a large number of participants, including influential individuals, functions on the individual and sociopolitical levels, causes participants to initiate their own peace-building projects, improves intergroup relations, and/or instigates change or reform of political institutions.

The author concludes that NDC Sarajevo’s dialogue projects were able to positively affect the broader sociopolitical context in BiH through the work of its affiliated alumni action groups who “succeeded in de-ethnicizing everyday problems local communities face, showing that it is possible to bridge ethnic divides” and engage in joint activism to address these problems in a way that serves the common interest. She bases this conclusion on the following evidence, in light of RPP criteria. First, NDC Sarajevo involved many individuals who were influential and well-respected in their communities, including municipality councilors. But dialogues—and alumni-organized activities—reached not just this “middle-range” level of community leaders but also many individuals from the “grassroots,” especially students, parents, teachers, and other municipal officials.

Second, while the dialogue projects certainly built trust and understanding on the interpersonal level, they also leveraged these newfound relationships and common perspectives on current problems to influence the sociopolitical level, encouraging participants to engage in joint action to address the problems they identified. Third, the participants themselves developed their own plans of action for addressing these community problems and took ownership over these peacebuilding initiatives. Fourth, over the course of these projects, participants demonstrated a willingness to work across ethnic lines to address these common problems.

And, finally, although NDC Sarajevo was unable to directly change institutions that were reinforcing ethnic divisions, NDC participants engaged in activities that “challenged [these] ... institutions and lessened the negative role they play,” such as their activities to encourage relationship-building and common identity formation among students of different ethnicities. Crucially, students from one multi-ethnic high school with a high number of self-identifying “Nansen kids” protested the local government’s proposal to bring back mono-ethnic high schools, effectively preventing this backward slide into even more dysfunctional institutions.

The main limitation to NDC Sarajevo’s work identified was a lack of long-term strategic thinking and coordination on the part of action groups—something the author argues would only enhance their ability to influence the broader societal context.
TALKING POINTS

In the context of the work of the Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH),

- Dialogue projects have influenced attitudes and relations at the interpersonal level, with participants reporting increased understanding and mutual trust, among other changes.
- Dialogue projects have also been able to positively affect the broader sociopolitical context in BiH, largely through the work of affiliated alumni action groups who have engaged in joint action and activism to address societal problems, thereby demonstrating “that it is possible to bridge ethnic divides.”
- Dialogue participants themselves identified and developed their own plans of action for addressing key community problems, thereby taking ownership over these peacebuilding initiatives.
- In particular, dialogue participants focused much of their joint action and activism on challenging the segregated school system in BiH, encouraging relationship-building and common identity formation among students of different ethnicities.
INFORMING PRACTICE

This research, like other research recently highlighted in the Peace Science Digest on the work of the Israeli encounter organization Sadaka-Reut, underscores how important it is for dialogue organizations and projects to provide the infrastructure to support and follow up with dialogue participants. Most crucially, if dialogue is to result in anything further than momentary interpersonal connection across ethnic divisions—indeed, if it is to play a critical role in creating broader change at the societal level—participants must have the support they need to engage in joint action and activism to confront and address the problems they identify in their communities. One of the key dimensions to the success of these joint actions undertaken by alumni of the Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC) Sarajevo is that they were completely devised by the participants themselves, once they had had the chance to break down stereotypes and build trust, rather than identified ahead of time by NDC Sarajevo. As the author notes, this model creates a much stronger sense of ownership among alumni for these actions, but it also presents a challenge when it comes to funding. Leaving completely open the kind of joint projects that might be conceived after a dialogue process may not sit well with donors who often require clear deliverables on a pre-set timeframe.

For this reason, the author urges donors instead to “be prepared to provide organizations with continuous support and sufficient time to instigate the needed changes.” This move requires funders to be comfortable with a great deal of uncertainty about how their money is going to be spent, as it is precisely this uncertainty about the ultimate outcomes of a dialogue that makes it a particularly powerful mode of interaction and its outcomes potentially more sustainable. (On this last point, see Šavija-Valha and Šahić’s 2015 book on NDC Sarajevo’s dialogue projects under Continued Reading.) Although this approach requires a measure of “letting-go” by outside actors—whether donors or peacebuilding organizations—who already have well-developed ideas about the kind of change they wish to see in the places where they work, peacebuilding efforts can be more effective and sustainable when local communities and participants are provided space and support to develop their own ideas for change.

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U.S. Ambassador, ret.
Chairman and CEO, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

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Kelly Campbell
Executive Director, Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility Co-founder, 9/11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows

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