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Our vision is a world beyond war by 2030 and humanity united by a global system of peace with justice.

Our mission is to advance the Global Peace System by supporting, developing and collaborating with peacebuilding efforts in all sectors of society.

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Members of women's forums are enjoying their newfound voice and role in cross border peace building. USAID’s PEACE III supports key actors, including local leaders, women and youth in the targeted cross-border cluster areas to deepen and broaden transformative social reconciliation processes.
Peace and Conflict Studies (henceforth: Peace Science) has emerged as an academic discipline with its own graduate programs, handbooks, research tools, theories, associations, journals, and conferences. As with most scientific communities, the slow migration of academic knowledge into practical application becomes a limiting factor of a field’s growth, its impact, and the overall effectiveness of its practitioners.

The expanding academic field of Peace Science continues to produce high volumes of significant research that often goes unnoticed by practitioners, the media, activists, public policy-makers, and other possible beneficiaries. This is unfortunate, because Peace Science ultimately should inform the practice on how to bring about peace.

*The research and theory needed to guide peace workers to produce more enduring and positive peace, not only more peace studies, have come to stay. Bridging the gap between the peace movement moralism and foreign policy pragmatism is a major challenge facing everyone who seeks to achieve peace on Earth.* (Johan Galtung and Charles Webel)

To address this issue, the War Prevention Initiative has created the *Peace Science Digest* as a way to disseminate top selections of research and findings from the field’s academic community to its many beneficiaries.

The *Peace Science Digest* is formulated to enhance awareness of scholarship addressing the key issues of our time by making available an organized, condensed, and comprehensible summary of this important research as a resource for the practical application of the field’s current academic knowledge.
Dear Readers,

In our previous issue (Volume 4, Issue 2), we noted that rising tensions between the United States and Iran “may leave us with the impression that war is inevitable [but] it is not.” The situation has escalated further since its publication. Our editorial team wishes to express in strong terms that a war between the United States and Iran is unacceptable. Patrick Hiller, member of our editorial board and Executive Director of the War Prevention Initiative, recently participated in a podcast with Popular Resistance to discuss how to de-escalate the conflict. In it, he suggests that:

• It’s not too late to act.

• Activists should target media outlets, not just sympathetic outlets but those that cover a range of political views and sentiments.

• A critical narrative is missing from this discussion, insofar as Iran is always framed as the bad actor, and there is little recognition of how the U.S. and its actions are perceived in Iran.

• Activists can start changing the narrative by humanizing Iranians, engaging with local Iranian immigrant communities, or supporting exchange programs with Iran.

• Activists can request meetings or townhalls with their congressional representatives to discuss concerns.

• Nonviolent resistance is necessary to stop the path towards war.

Of course, conflict between the U.S. and Iran is one of many peace and security challenges facing the global community. In this issue, we examine a set of articles with a great deal of regional diversity—two articles focus on peacebuilding or peacekeeping in Africa, one looks at resistance to exclusionary nationalism in Bosnia (Europe), another explores “uncivil society” in Bougainville and Timor-Leste (Asia-Pacific), and, finally, one considers military checkpoints in Iraq (Middle East).

Several articles note the importance of local groups, traditional governance mechanisms, or local customs in influencing outcomes for peace, either towards a stronger, more sustainable peace or towards a weaker one. How local actors are incorporated in peace and security activities matters—from local guards contracted by UN peacekeepers to subversive “uncivil” society organizations in peacebuilding or transitional justice processes. Sometimes, the inclusion of certain local actors can exacerbate insecurity whereas, in other contexts, their exclusion can do the same. These findings only heighten our awareness of the complexities and challenges involved in peacebuilding after war. All the more reason to avoid war in the first place.

Another theme that emerges in this issue is the tendency to create and reinforce exclusionary identities during wartime—whether in the context of military checkpoints in Iraq or in the context of ethnic violence in Bosnia—and the critical need to resist this impulse if we are to prevent the escalation of violence. If nothing else, this finding must remain at the core of our resistance to the current escalatory spiral between the U.S. and Iran. We refuse to see Iranians as the “enemy.”

Your Peace Science Digest Editorial Team,
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Traditional Governance and the Maintenance of Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa

This article offers new insights into the prevention of civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa by examining the role that traditional authority (TA) plays in supporting outcomes for war or peace. The prevention of civil wars is among the top concerns for international peace and security practitioners. Much of the previous research on this question has focused on state capacity, theorizing that a strong centralized state is key for establishing peace. Yet, this is not always the case. Many sub-Saharan African countries with “limited” state capacity are still able to maintain peace. Such anomalies could be explained by how and under what conditions the state and TA interact. Do they operate as parallel structures with little to no interaction? Or, do they coordinate, even integrate, public administration activities?

In Malawi, the author finds an exemplary case where local chiefs were instrumental to the transition from single-party rule to multi-party democracy in the mid-1990s. Chiefs in Malawi have had constitutionally recognized roles in the state’s public administration before and after the transition to democracy. During the transition, local chiefs played a stabilizing role when “the dissolution of the old state structures and the malfunctioning of the new local government structures created a governance vacuum at the local level.” TA played similar roles in Ghana and Mozambique. To better understand the relationship between TA and the state, the author developed an analytical framework and a unique dataset.

The analytical framework developed four types of interaction between TA and the state that ranged from the exclusion of TA to the inclusion of TA in the government’s public administration (institutional hybridity). Between these two extremes, the state might provide symbolic recognition to TA or formally acknowledge its existence as a parallel authority (institutional multiplicity).
This framework generated two hypotheses. First, concordant interactions should lead to a lower rate of intrastate war than discordant. Second, TA inclusion in the state’s public administration (institutional hybridity) should decrease the likelihood of armed conflict onset more than all other types of interactions. The logic here is that concordant interactions are likely to encourage coordination between the two entities. By improving coordination between the state and TA, competition is minimized, as is the incentive to take up arms.

A unique dataset was developed looking at 44 sub-Saharan African countries from 1989 to 2012 and coding whether or not a country experienced the outbreak of armed conflict during that time period. Additionally, each country-year is coded for whether or not there is an “explicit recognition of traditional governance as a parallel structure of governance or part of public administration” and, separately, which of the four interaction types best characterizes the relationship between TA and the state. Several control variables were added, including former colonial status (British colony or not), political regime type, per capita gross domestic product, market dependence on primary commodities, population size, ethnic fractionalization, and years since last armed conflict outbreak.

The outbreak of armed conflict is rare, happening in only 53 out of 835 country-year pairings. When considered in relation to institutional type, the outbreak of armed conflict is rarer in country-years characterized by institutional hybridity (2%) than in country-years characterized by symbolic recognition (13%), exclusion (8.5%), or institutional multiplicity (4.8%). After running statistical tests to assess the relationship between institutional type and armed conflict, the author found that concordant interactions are associated with a decreased likelihood of the outbreak of armed conflict in relation to discordant types—from 11% (discordant) to 4% (concordant). Holding everything else constant, the author finds that institutional hybridity decreases the risk of armed conflict outbreak by 60%.

Importantly, the author concludes, “countries seem to gain the added value of traditional authorities only by incorporating them into the state administration rather than recognizing their authority alongside the state administration.”

Other notable results include the effect of British colonial legacy. Excluding traditional authorities in former British colonies showed a conflict-inducing effect. And institutional hybridity had a decreased effect on the outbreak of armed conflict in former British colonies. In other words, the main finding of this article that showed a 60% reduced risk of armed conflict in countries with institutional hybridity was less robust in former British colonies. The author theorizes that British indirect colonial rule maintained traditional governance structures, making those structures more resilient and in a better position to collaborate with the new state structures after decolonization. As a result, institutional hybridity was more likely to encourage coordination in former British colonies. It’s unclear why colonial legacy matters here, and the author calls for additional research.
TALKING POINTS

In Sub-Saharan Africa:

- Traditional governance, including local chiefs, kings, or conflict resolution mechanisms, can play a powerful role in maintaining peace if it is integrated with the public administration of the state (a scenario called “institutional hybridity”).
- Institutional hybridity is associated with a 60% decrease in the risk of armed conflict outbreak.
- Short of institutional hybridity, other types of interactions between traditional governance and the state do not appear to play a significant role in maintaining peace.
- The colonial legacy of sub-Saharan African countries matters: the main finding of a 60% reduced risk of armed conflict appears less robust in former British colonies.
Questions of governance, state capacity, and peace are core to the debate on effectiveness in foreign aid. Brookings reports that, since the early 1990s, foreign aid to recipient countries “has tended to support domestic policy reform efforts” and that “economic policies matter for aid effectiveness, but at least as important as determinant of aid effectiveness are good governance and corruption control.” Many academics and practitioners alike affirm linkages between good governance, international development aid, and the prevention of war, arguing that these key components can work in harmony to support prosperous and peaceful countries. For instance, the USAID FY 2018 budget requested $92 million in “Transition Initiatives funding to address opportunities and challenges to prevent conflict, stabilize emerging democratic processes, and respond quickly to urgent, unanticipated crises in countries critical to US foreign policy.”

This approach, linking funding to state capacity and good governance to support peace, is not inherently wrong. As this author notes, much of the previous academic literature on this topic has demonstrated this relationship (see Continued Reading). However, this article demonstrates that state capacity and good governance are not necessarily linked to centralized states—meaning that supporting peace does not always go hand in hand with simply increasing the authority and legitimacy of national governments. This article provides compelling evidence for why this might be the case especially for sub-Saharan African countries, where state capacity can be hamstrung by a wide variety of factors (extreme poverty, developing economies, or corruption, for example) and local traditional governance often garners legitimacy.

The implications for foreign aid are questionable. Foreign aid is as politically motivated as it is oriented towards broader impact because it is one of the many tools in a country’s proverbial diplomatic tool shed. Maintaining good relationships between national governments is fundamental to diplomacy. However, if countries conceptualize the prevention of civil wars as one of their many foreign policy goals (as the “Transition Initiatives” in the USAID budget implies), then the incorporation of traditional authorities in the public administration of recipient countries may be a new component of “good governance” to support through foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa.

“Uncivil” Society Organizations in Bougainville and Timor-Leste: Subverting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Settings


The role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in transitional justice (judicial or non-judicial measures to address human rights abuses in post-conflict countries) or peacebuilding is highlighted in much of the field’s research and practice. The incorporation of local civil society, however, is predicated on the assumption that these groups are “civil,” support liberalism, and have broad membership that transcends social divisions. Yet, uncivil society organizations also exist that can undermine or spoil the peace process. What role do these groups play in transitional justice and peace processes? This article argues that transitional justice and peacebuilding research and practice should adopt “a more nuanced and contextual understanding of civil society, which pays attention to the cultural, historical, and political conditions in the conflict-affected society in question.”

The author supports this argument through two case studies: the civil wars in Bougainville and Timor-Leste. She conducted fieldwork in both locations, conducting interviews, immersing herself in the community, and consulting media reports and other sources to analyze how uncivil society groups in Bougainville and Timor-Leste subverted transitional justice and reconciliation processes.

In Bougainville, the civil war from 1989 to 1997 formally ended with a comprehensive political settlement in 2001 that granted the region political autonomy. The transitional justice process went no further than providing for pardons and amnesty in the peace agreement. By 2005, the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) was established but lacked the capacity to provide many public goods. As a result of the ABG’s limited capacity and a limited transitional justice and peacebuilding process, several “uncivil society” groups did not initially acknowledge the authority of the ABG. The largest group, Me’ekamui, was founded by Francis Ona and occupied large tracks of territory on the island, particularly around contentious copper and gold mines. Ona declared independence during the peace process and set up an armed “no-go zone” that included between 5-10% of the Bougainville population. This “no-go zone” operated as a rival to the newly established ABG with its “own institutions and dispute resolution, and security force.” It was only after Ona’s death in 2005 that...
the Me'ekamui leadership split, with one fraction establishing a joint authority with ABG. As the ABG became more established and legitimate, these groups converged with agreements on landowners’ associations, mining access, and disarmament and demobilization.

In Timor-Leste, military invasion and occupation by Indonesia resulted in decades of violence between armed rebel groups and the Indonesian military. After independence in 2002, several transitional justice and reconciliation processes took place with varying degrees of success. However, several uncivil society organizations remained opposed to the newly formed government and, thus, outside of the formal peace, transitional justice, and reconciliation processes. They proceeded to subvert the peace and reconciliation process by creating rival governance. Two in particular, the Conselho Popular de Defesa da Republica Democratica de Timor Leste (CPD-RDTL) and the Sagrada Familia, are affiliate organizations that gained support among veterans of the resistance movement.

Members of the CPD-RDTL felt that their contributions to the resistance movement went unacknowledged. Other members included poor Timorese who “felt marginalized during the state-building process.” The CPD-RDTL would rival the new government by collecting its own taxes and issuing identification cards. Eventually, the Timor-Leste government criminalized the CPD-RDTL and authorized police to target members of the group. Sagrada Familia continued the work of CPD-RDTL afterwards and employed religious imagery and beliefs in addition to its anti-state ideology to gain support. Over time, Sagrada Familia moderated its stance and began to engage with the government.

The author suggests five applicable lessons on uncivil society in post-conflict countries with respect to transitional justice and reconciliation processes. First, there is room for uncivil society organizations to challenge the newly formed state and peace process by creating rival institutions. Second, uncivil society organizations gain support and legitimacy through a variety of methods including alternative interpretations of historical events, religious imagery, or a claim to better represent local socio-political or economic practices. Third, membership of many uncivil society organization included ex-combatants, meaning that parties should seriously consider the inclusion of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as part of the formal peace process. Fourth, individuals’ “unresolved personal grievances and their competition for political power, can play [a role] in facilitating the emergence of uncivil society groups.” Finally, internationally supported transitional justice and reconciliation efforts should aim for greater sensitivity to local socio-political practices and historical and cultural contexts. The inclusion of uncivil society organizations, which may not align with international norms but do represent local norms, is important to minimize the potential subversion of these efforts.
TALKING POINTS

• In many post-conflict countries, uncivil society groups exist and may act to subvert the peace and reconciliation process.
• In Bougainville and Timor-Leste, uncivil society groups were composed of ex-combatants or poor and/or marginalized communities who felt that they were excluded from the peace and reconciliation process.
• Research and practice in transitional justice should take a more nuanced approach to engaging local civil society in post-conflict countries and consider greater inclusion of uncivil society in transitional justice efforts.

INFORMING PRACTICE

The author argues that uncivil society organizations have been overlooked in conventional transitional justice and reconciliation because the idea of civil society is informed by the experience in liberal (mostly Western) democracies. Further, in conflict-affected societies, “there can be no clear distinction between civil society and the state, particularly as CSOs frequently deliver public goods typically expected to be provided by the state and consequently both present themselves and act as alternatives to the state.” International interventions in post-conflict countries may be advised to check their assumptions on the role of civil, or uncivil, society organizations. Many of the transitional justice and reconciliation processes in Timor-Leste, for instance, were backed by the UN. UN-backed truth and reconciliation mechanisms are charged both to support compliance with international norms and standards and to be responsive to the local context when designing these mechanisms. However, with mostly liberal, Western democracies with the decision-making power in the UN Security Council (the United States, France, and the United Kingdom constitute three of the five permanent members with veto power), it is challenging to genuinely incorporate local political contexts that are divergent from liberal, Western political norms into these mechanisms.

International interventions in post-conflict countries may be biased toward including or supporting organizations or individuals that demonstrate shared liberal or Western values, potentially excluding those uncivil society groups that garner local support because they employ traditional values and customs. This is what, in part, drove support for uncivil society groups in Timor-Leste: that the new government was composed of “exiled” Timorese elites who no longer reflected the local socio-political context. The uncivil society groups, CPD-RDTL and Sagrada Familia, claimed that they were more authentic representations of the Timorese people.

It’s debatable whether those claims of representation by CPD-RDTL and Sagrada Familia were true; regardless, these groups continued to garner local support. Such cases demonstrate the greater risk to long-term peace of excluding uncivil society organizations that may not necessarily hold liberal values from a peace and reconciliation process. Inclusion is preferable to exclusion in post-conflict settings even if incorporating such groups may present its own challenges.

Although private military and security companies (PMSCs) have attracted public attention in recent years, this attention has focused primarily on high-profile scandals related to military contractors in the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In academic research, debates have centered on the ethical dimensions of privatized security instead of on their practical effects. This study focuses instead on the everyday use of PMSCs in UN peacekeeping operations—a context where their use is only beginning to gain recognition and scrutiny—and on the practical implications thereof. Narrowing in on the case of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), MONUSCO, the authors ask, “How do contractors shape security management within UN peacekeeping operations, and what are the consequences for the security of mission staff and host populations?”

Drawing on a mix of sources, including interviews, UN documents, NGO reports, and field research, the authors examine how contractors have become integrated in MONUSCO’s security practices in three areas: the operation, representation, and regulation of security. Based on their analysis, they argue that “UN security contracting contributes in important ways not only to the differentiation and hardening of security, but also to the perpetuation of insecurity in UN peacekeeping.” The various elements of this argument will be clarified below.

First, on an operational level, the UN has begun to depend a great deal on private security contractors, especially to provide security at various UN compounds in the DRC. These “protective security contractors” are all regionally owned and locally staffed, and their guards are, by law, unarmed—though they often have special relationships with public police forces so that they can call on armed contingents if needed. Second, security contractors have also become central to the way the UN represents its mission and its security environment. Security guards are meant to embody visible deterrence by wearing military-type clothing and guarding areas bounded by barbed wire, high walls, and towers—symbols of intimidation. UN documents communicate a broader distrust of the local context, with private security guards represented as one answer to
that insecurity and danger—but also as occasionally sources of insecurity themselves. Finally, security contractors are one of many actors responsible for regulating UN security activities. This decentralization of regulation can lead to difficulties around pinpointing responsibility when there are questions about the behavior of security contractors.

The authors identify and discuss three major implications of this strong involvement of security contractors in MONUSCO. First, the involvement of security contractors, especially in guarding UN compounds, contributes to the “differentiation of security” whereby the security of UN officials and other “internationals” appears to be prioritized over the security of the local population. This is a function of simple market dynamics—if security is privatized, then only those who can afford it can receive it—but also of the role security contractors play guarding the perimeters of highly fortified UN compounds and conceiving the relevant security plans in the first place. The role of security contractors in the “bunkerization” of the UN presence contributes to community members’ negative image of them, as well as of MONUSCO. In particular, local civilians understand quite well that private security guards are there to protect MONUSCO, not the local community, and that MONUSCO is so sealed off from the community that it is unable to effectively protect local civilians either.

Second, the heavy reliance on security contractors has led to a “hardening of security”—a greater dependence on technology, equipment, and other trappings of militarized security, all of which contribute to the profits of security contractors. This emphasis leads to the adoption of more removed approaches to security provision, at the expense of “soft” skills like relationship-building that form the bedrock of civilian protection.

Third and finally, this reliance on security contractors contributes to the development of the local security economy, which can result in the perpetuation of insecurity in the community. The local security economy grows through the money earned by private guards and pumped into local police forces (to back up security contractors). Armed groups also potentially benefit financially to the extent that contractors inadvertently hire people who are still tied to these groups. In this sense, MONUSCO—through its reliance on privatized security—is potentially strengthening institutions and groups that are perceived as corrupt and/or as sources of insecurity for many Congolese people.

In the end, the authors find that even “seemingly uncontroversial, even benign” security activities—like the hiring of local, unarmed security contractors—can bring “unintended negative consequences,” ultimately alienating local civilians from MONUSCO peacekeepers and undermining the security of these local civilians.

Continued reading:


Organizations/Initiatives:
Nonviolent Peaceforce: www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org
Peace Brigades International: www.peacebrigades.org
TALKING POINTS

- Private security contractors have become central to the operation, representation, and regulation of security in the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
- The UN’s heavy reliance on security contractors in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) contributes to the perception that UN officials’ security is prioritized over the local population’s security, as well as to a greater dependence on hi-tech approaches to security that create more distance between UN peacekeepers and those they are meant to protect.
- The UN’s heavy reliance on security contractors in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) results in more money for institutions and groups that are perceived as corrupt and/or as sources of insecurity for many Congolese people.
- Even “seemingly uncontroversial, even benign” security activities—like the hiring of local, unarmed security contractors—can bring “unintended negative consequences,” ultimately alienating local civilians from UN peacekeepers and undermining the security of these local civilians.

INFORMING PRACTICE

This research is especially relevant to the fourteen UN peacekeeping missions currently in operation around the world but also to any international humanitarian, development, or protection organizations working in war zones who draw on the services of security contractors. UN officials and other international personnel should be mindful of the way in which the reliance on security contractors—even in seemingly harmless ways—can have unintended consequences, ultimately with negative effects for the security of the local population. Three practical implications stand out. First, the widespread militarization of the security field, even in cases where security contractors are unarmed, can have significant ramifications for the image peacekeepers and other “internationals” portray to local populations. Although presumably good for deterrence, a military image can instead create an aura of intimidation and a barrier to relationship-building with the community. Instead, those providing security—if they are unarmed—should endeavor to draw out this unarmed status to their advantage and use it to create connections with the community, facilitating their ability to protect both UN staff and local people. Second, on a related note, this research draws into focus just how critical local perceptions are to the success of any intervention. Therefore, UN and other international personnel should continually attend to the ways in which their activities are being understood and responded to by community members and be ready to shift these activities accordingly if they are having counterproductive effects.

Finally, this study underscores the ultimate importance of proximity and relationship-building for civilian protection by identifying how both the “differentiation” and “hardening” of security result in further distance between UN peacekeepers and local populations—and therefore greater difficulty protecting them. This finding should not only make international personnel more hesitant to participate in the “bunkerization”
and militarization of UN missions but also create an opening for greater appreciation of the strengths of unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP). UCP makes proximity to and relationship-building with a broad range of actors in the community central to peacekeepers’ work. In addition, UCP makes a point of highlighting, rather than hiding, their unarmed status as they know that this only enhances their ability to build connections with the community and therefore their capacity to protect civilians.
Resisting Exclusionary Nationalism During the Bosnian War

During the early 1990s, while the rest of Yugoslavia was succumbing to virulent and exclusionary nationalism, the city of Tuzla—located in what is now northeastern Bosnia & Herzegovina—resisted these same forces, electing the only non-nationalist city government in wartime Yugoslavia and maintaining a proactively multicultural society. What explains this anomaly? What was different about Tuzla that enabled it to maintain itself as an inclusive enclave amid the ethnic violence of the Balkan Wars?

As the author notes, this research fills a gap in existing scholarship on the former Yugoslavia, as most studies look at the reasons for rising nationalism and violence in the 1980s and 1990s but not at explanations for why these processes did not unfold everywhere. To examine this question, the author engaged in field work in Tuzla in 2015, interviewing “Tuzla's wartime political elites, workers, members of civil society, members of academia, war veterans and members of the religious community” and also analyzing local and regional media sources and other documents. The research concludes that Tuzla’s capacity to resist exclusionary nationalist forces derives from its identity formation from 1878 to 1990 as a “multi-ethnic working class society with strong anti-fascist, anti-nationalist ideals.”

To explore the development of Tuzla’s distinctive identity, the author divides the city’s history into three identity formation processes: “bonding” (1878-1914), “forging” (1914-1945), and “cementing” (1945-1990). The first “bonding” process was marked by the industrialization of Tuzla under Austro-Hungarian administration, which required the immigration of skilled workers from the reaches of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to run the area’s salt and coal mines and other industries. What emerged was a diverse work force and society in Tuzla—“Italians, Slovenians, Germans, Polish, Slovaks, Austrians, Czechs and even Russians” in addition to various Bosnian ethnicities and an influx of people from rural areas—that saw itself as the backbone of this new industrial economy. Most of those interviewed in this research identified this widespread immigration of workers as the root of Tuzla’s tolerant, multicultural, and non-nationalistic ethos.

This ethos was further strengthened during the identity “forging” process between the world wars. A labor movement started to organize itself in response to poor working conditions amid the economic and human...
devastation of World War I. To fill gaps in the workforce due to wartime casualties, Tuzla had to bring in miners from Slovenia. Their presence provided an opportunity for fellow miners to demonstrate the solidarity that was developing between workers of various ethnicities and nationalities in Tuzla. In order to pre-empt a massive strike, the central government in Belgrade jailed potential strikers and ordered Slovenian miners to return home, spurring their local colleagues to take them in. When police forces tried to force Slovenian miners out, they were met with armed rebellion, which then spread to other cities. The armed rebellion was ultimately quelled by the army, but it and the rousing act of solidarity that precipitated it remain touchstones of Tuzla’s emergent identity as a unified, multi-ethnic, working-class community unafraid of standing up to injustice. The latter aspect of this identity was further solidified during World War II when “anti-fascist partisan forces” fought to free Tuzla from Nazi control in 1943 and again in 1944.

Finally, the identity “cementing” period corresponds with the end of World War II until 1990, during which time Tuzla adopted and embodied the values and identity of the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: “multiculturalism, anti-fascism, self-management socialist economy, cultural, social and educational growth.” Two features of Tuzla’s experience are key: “economic prosperity and a high rate of worker immigration.” After WWII, Tuzla’s economy “flourished,” with higher GDP growth than anywhere else in the country, again resulting in workers immigrating, especially from other corners of Yugoslavia. This allowed for greater mixing between rural and urban populations and reinforced Tuzla’s multicultural identity. With such a large percentage of the city’s population working in the mines and other industries, a strong, diverse workers identity took hold, creating a “cohesive social fabric” and the vigorous adoption of Yugoslavia’s “socialist principles [of] solidarity and equality.” In the 1991 census, for instance, Tuzla had the highest numbers of people identifying as “Yugoslav” rather than narrower ethnic or religious identities. Combined with Tuzla’s “anti-fascist tradition,” these dimensions equipped the city to resist ethnic polarization and nationalist violence when it swept the rest of Yugoslavia.

Importantly, political elites in Tuzla were able to make risky decisions—maintaining non-nationalist parties, protecting minorities as well as the city’s multicultural ethos against fascist/nationalist forces during the war—precisely because large portions of the population had developed a strong multinational and socialist identity, signaling their support for these actions that countered the prevailing forces of the day.
TALKING POINTS

• The city of Tuzla was able to resist exclusionary nationalist forces during the Bosnian War due to its identity formation from 1878 to 1990 as a “multi-ethnic working class society with strong anti-fascist, anti-nationalist ideals.”
• The widespread immigration of workers to Tuzla during the city’s industrialization and the growing solidarity between these diverse workers in the labor movement account for Tuzla’s tolerant, multicultural, and non-nationalistic ethos.
• Tuzla’s history of resistance against authoritarianism and fascism became part of the city’s identity, which also became intertwined with the values and identity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when it formed after WWII.
• Political elites in Tuzla were able to make risky decisions—maintaining non-nationalist parties, protecting minorities as well as the city’s multicultural ethos against fascist/nationalist forces during the Bosnian War—because large portions of the population had developed a strong multicultural and socialist identity and therefore supported these decisions.

INFORMING PRACTICE

As exclusionary forms of nationalism once again take hold throughout Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere, cases such as Tuzla acquire ever greater significance and have much to teach us. What are the most effective ways to resist nationalism and the violence against those marked as “outsiders”—whether ethnic/racial minorities or immigrants/refugees—that can accompany it? At first glance, the findings in this research seem difficult to apply, as the author identifies long-standing structural factors and identities that account for Tuzla’s unique ability to withstand the attraction of ethnic nationalism in the midst of war. Upon closer inspection, however, there are a few lessons that can be useful in other contexts. First, it is important to note that the citizens of Tuzla had a strong workers identity that allowed them to resist the gravitational pull towards their respective ethnic identities. In other words, the presence of a common, cross-cutting identity may be necessary to ward off or supplant more exclusionary identities. It is worth considering what that cross-cutting identity might be today: a proactively multicultural national identity (as the U.S. American identity can be), a human/planetary identity, or a workers identity, depending on the context. Cultivating strong yet benign forms of identity through historical narratives, community rituals, holidays, forms of recognition, and so on—rather than simply rejecting malicious forms of identity—may be the key to preventing exclusionary forms of nationalism from taking hold.

Second, although the steady influx of workers from diverse locales into Tuzla is identified as one of the factors contributing to this multicultural ethos, it was how the community reacted in key moments to challenges against specific groups that solidified this ethos. For instance, it took many workers deciding to take in their Slovenian colleagues when they were being ordered to leave that reinforced the solidarity so central to Tuzla’s identity. In other words, agency and free will matter, even in the context of predisposing (or challenging) conditions. We are always in the process of shaping and reinforcing the group identities to which we belong. Though we may experience these identities as structural forces that constrain or influence our behavior,
our everyday actions also create these identities. Many of us already live in diverse societies, but that in itself may not be enough to create an ethos that celebrates that diversity. If we want to become a welcoming society that can withstand xenophobia and racism, then we can engage in everyday actions that resist these forces by standing in solidarity with the most vulnerable groups among us. In doing so, we create a welcoming identity that can then, in turn, start to have its own constraining effects on other people’s actions, as they start identifying with it and acting accordingly.

Finally, we must remember that it was the widespread multicultural, anti-fascist, workers identity among Tuzla’s citizens that enabled political elites to stick their necks out to safeguard non-nationalist politics and protect minorities. Often, it is easiest to blame our politicians for the messes we may find ourselves in. But we, as citizens, are the ones who create the space they need to act, and it is ultimately the work of convincing and mobilizing one another and communicating our support (or disapproval) to our representatives that will make risky leadership possible, especially resisting nationalist or militarist impulses.

Photo Credit: Jaime Silva.
During the Croat-Bosniak Conflict (1991-93) this bridge was completely destroyed. After the end of the war, the bridge was reconstructed as a symbol of peace and ethnic harmony. It was rebuilt with the same materials and original techniques.
How Feelings Make Military Checkpoints Even More Dangerous for Civilians in Iraq


Keywords | Iraq, military checkpoints, security, affect, prejudices, stereotypes, civilians in conflict

U.S. military checkpoints in Iraq and other places where U.S. troops are present are considered normal and necessary components of security. When attacked, the vulnerability of the checkpoints and the dangers to the soldiers operating them are discussed in the media and beyond. Missing from these conversations are the everyday dangers for civilians when they approach a checkpoint. An average of one Iraqi civilian a day was killed or injured at a military checkpoint between 2006 and 2007. Shedding light on this largely unnoticed but deadly context, the author of this article examines how the idea of “hostile intent” has been used to justify the need to use lethal force against civilians.

The prescribed conduct for dealing with “hostile intent” is written into the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) defined by the U.S. Department of Defense. These rules allow soldiers to use deadly force against anyone posing an imminent threat and characterize this force as legitimate self-defense. These deliberately broad and elastic standards were set “to cope with the uncertainty and unpredictability of the situation at checkpoints.” Going beyond ambiguous rules and how they are followed, the author’s main argument is that affective judgements—inner dispositions or feelings—and racial assumptions are complementary to conscious rule-based decisions made by troops on the use of lethal force at checkpoints.

The study was conducted by examining an archive of 154 declassified incident reports, which the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) received via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The reports and the soldier testimonies included in them revealed that even mundane acts such as driving too fast near a coalition checkpoint, swaying into the wrong lane, avoiding eye contact, walking erratically, and becoming agitated when stopped by soldiers could lead to civilians being killed. Yet in more than three-quarters of the reported incidents, investigators concluded that the soldiers had acted in accordance with the SROE on hostile intent and the right to self-defense. Consequently, most of the incidents were considered tragic mistakes or accidents and lumped with other forms of collateral damage.
Continued reading:


Organizations/Initiatives:
Center for Civilians in Conflict: https://civiliansinconflict.org
Nonviolent Peaceforce: https://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org

The author argues that affective judgements are not spontaneous but rather are based on a set of gendered and racialized assumptions “that mark certain bodies [in particular, Middle Eastern men] as dangerous before they even arrive on the scene.” In the fast-paced context of checkpoint encounters, a calm assessment for rational, rule-based decision-making rarely takes place. Previous encounters and general assumptions—for example, stereotypes—about the local population approaching the checkpoint play into how soldiers respond to different situations. “Bad feelings” then can lead to deadly encounters. Visual cues (running away; looking nervous; reaching into a pocket) can be interpreted by soldiers as a threat. The analysis revealed that “being a military-age male” was sufficient to generate a considerable amount of unease or anxiety among troops at coalition checkpoints.” One cautious explanation lies in the comparison to police killings of African Americans in the U.S., where “subtle visual cues” are enough to identify potential threats. In the study, military-age males were more likely perceived as a threat when there had been previous attacks at a checkpoint. Regardless of their behavior, military-age males were already viewed with suspicion, making it more likely that any of their actions would be presumed to be hostile.

In sum, the author broadens debates about checkpoint killings and hostile intent. The analysis of testimonies in the reports showed that soldiers talked about bad feelings, gut instincts, or a tense atmosphere, even when only asked to present the facts of checkpoint killings. This shows that soldiers’ feelings and intuitions mattered just as much as SROE. Checkpoint killings need to be understood in a context where affect, racial assumptions, and conscious decision-making all combine to inform choices made by soldiers. The analysis of the incident reports indicated that experiences from the past and unquestioned (racial) prejudices informed those reactions. Consequently, deadly checkpoint encounters cannot be reduced by tightening the rules of engagement but instead by addressing soldiers’ inner dispositions and presumptions and how they came into existence.

TALKING POINTS

• An average of one Iraqi civilian was killed at a coalition checkpoint each day between 2006 and 2007.
• Affective registers—inner dispositions or feelings—and racial assumptions are complementary to conscious rule-based decisions on the use of lethal force at checkpoints in Iraq.
• 154 declassified incident reports revealed that even mundane acts such as driving too fast near a coalition checkpoint, swaying into the wrong lane, or becoming agitated when stopped by soldiers could lead to civilians being killed.

INFORMING PRACTICE

This research carries multiple lessons that go beyond making the Standard Rules of Engagement (SROE) less ambiguous. Certainly, tightened rules of engagement that equally emphasize physical safety for checkpoint soldiers and civilians would likely reduce killings. More broadly, though, a first step is to create awareness about the issue of checkpoint killings on all sides (soldiers and civilians). An awareness campaign, dialog processes, and culturally sensitive de-escalation practices are useful steps to reduce the killings. These do not, however, address how human feelings and presumptions inform life or death decision-making processes. Moreover, they do not address the broader dehumanization integral to warfare.

More fundamentally, there are direct implications here for how soldiers’ presumptions about “dangerous bodies” can be transformed. As the research showed, Middle Eastern military-age males were already viewed with suspicion. By creating encounter programs as part of the awareness campaign, personal prejudices and enemy images can be challenged. While long-held, deep assumptions about “the other” will not be immediately changed, intergroup contact theory suggests that interpersonal contact (in this case, between coalition soldiers and military-age Iraqi males) can reduce prejudices between groups. It should be noted, however, that the conditions under which this would take place in Iraq—or other countries that the U.S. has militarily occupied—are less than ideal. The power imbalance between the occupying force and the occupied should lead us to consider the broader discussion of warfare.

In war, the dehumanization of “the other” is commonly used to justify violence and killings. The enemy is evil, one’s own side is good. Those who are innocent are often swept up in sanitized language such as “escalation of force” (shooting at civilians) or “collateral damage” (killing civilians). This language disguises the killing and suffering of human beings. This language is used to maintain overarching myths about the inevitability, necessity, and beneficial effects of wars.

It would be too easy to blame U.S. soldiers for their actions at checkpoints. They are placed in a situation where their mere human-ness of having a “bad feeling” about a situation or person determines the life or death of other humans. That is not acceptable.
In addition to more operational fixes addressed above, the entire context needs to be transformed. The “inhuman” that is maintained in warfare, and the language around it, needs to be humanized.

An aspirational goal, provided it has multi-stakeholder and local support, can be the introduction of unarmed civilian peacekeepers (e.g., Nonviolent Peaceforce) with the goal of eliminating dangerous military checkpoints and ending occupations. Unarmed civilian peacekeepers, if invited and accepted by the local communities, can take over security operations such as searching vehicles for explosives, while at the same time actively engaging with local communities in dialog processes, reconciliation efforts, and the restoration of the social fabric. The former would fall more into traditional peacekeeping operations (prevention of violence), while the latter already introduces important peacebuilding components (prevention of violence and promotion of lasting and sustainable peace). Unarmed civilian peacekeepers are not part of the war machinery. They are typically not targets for attacks by violent groups. If they are successful and have buy-in from the communities they are engaged in, nonviolent peacekeepers can create a context where military occupation can no longer be justified and civilian efforts to build lasting peace are used exclusively.

Dehumanization is a psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration. Psychologically, it is necessary to categorize one’s enemy as sub-human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the violation of basic human rights.

[TESTIMONIALS]

This Magazine is where the academic field and the practitioners meet. It is the ideal source for the Talkers, the Writers and the Doers who need to inform and educate themselves about the fast growing field of Peace Science for War Prevention Initiatives!

John W. McDonald
U.S. Ambassador, ret.
Chairman and CEO, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

As a longtime peace activist, I’ve grown weary of the mainstream perception that “peace is for dreamers.” That’s why the Peace Science Digest is such as useful tool; it gives me easy access to the data and the science to make the case for peacebuilding and war prevention as both practical and possible. This is a wonderful new resource for all who seek peaceful solutions in the real world.

Kelly Campbell
Executive Director, Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility Co-founder, 9/11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows

The Peace Science Digest is the right approach to an ever-present challenge: how do you get cutting-edge peace research that is often hidden in hard-to-access academic journals into the hands of a broader audience? With its attractive on-line format, easy to digest graphics and useful short summaries, the Peace Science Digest is a critically important tool for anyone who cares about peace – as well as a delight to read.

Aubrey Fox
Executive Director (FMR), Institute for Economics and Peace

The field of peace science has long suffered from a needless disconnect between current scholarship and relevant practice. The Peace Science Digest serves as a vital bridge. By regularly communicating cutting-edge peace research to a general audience, this publication promises to advance contemporary practice of peace and nonviolent action. I don’t know of any other outlet that has developed such an efficient forum for distilling the key insights from the latest scholarly innovations for anyone who wants to know more about this crucial subject. I won’t miss an issue.

Erica Chenoweth
Professor & Associate Dean for Research at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver

Peace Science Digest is a valuable tool for translating scholarly research into practical conclusions in support of evidence-based approaches to preventing armed conflict.

David Cortright
Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame

How many times are we asked about the effectiveness of alternatives to violent conflict? Reading Peace Science Digest offers a quick read on some of the best research focused on that important question. It offers talking points and summarizes practical implications. Readers are provided with clear, accessible explanations of theories and key concepts. It is a valuable resource for policy-makers, activists and scholars. It is a major step in filling the gap between research findings and application.

Joseph Bock
Director, School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding and Development

We must welcome the expansion of peace awareness into any and every area of our lives, in most of which it must supplant the domination of war and violence long established there. The long-overdue and much appreciated Digest is filling an important niche in that ‘peace invasion.’ No longer will anyone be able to deny that peace is a science that can be studied and practiced.

Michael Nagler
Founder of the Metta Center for Nonviolence

The Peace Science Digest is a major contribution to the peace and security field. It makes complex issues more understandable, enabling professional outfits like ours to be more effective in our global work. The Digest underscores that preventing war is about more than good intentions or power; it is also about transferable knowledge and science.

Mark Freeman
Founder and Executive Director of the Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT).

The distillation of the latest academic studies offered by the Peace Science Digest is not only an invaluable time-saving resource for scholars and policymakers concerned with preventing the next war, but for journalists and organizers on the front lines, who can put their findings to good use as they struggle to hold the powerful accountable and to build a more just and peaceful world.

Eric Stoner
Co-founder and Editor, Waging Nonviolence

Peace Science Digest is an invaluable tool for advocates for peace, as much as for educators. In it one quickly finds the talking points needed to persuade others, and the research to back those points up.

David Swanson
Director, World Beyond War

“How many times are we asked about the effectiveness...”

“...of alternatives to violent conflict? Reading Peace Science Digest offers a quick read on some of the best research focused on that important question. It offers talking points and summarizes practical implications. Readers are provided with clear, accessible explanations of theories and key concepts. It is a valuable resource for policy-makers, activists and scholars. It is a major step in filling the gap between research findings and application.”

Maria J. Stephan
Senior Advisor, United States Institute of Peace
RECOMMENDED SOURCES OF PEACE JOURNALISM AND ANALYSIS:

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  A peace and justice op-ed distribution service and an extensive library of ready-to-publish commentary and op-eds written by peace professionals, focusing on changing the U.S. national conversation about the possibilities of peace and justice and the destructive cycle of war and injustice. PeaceVoice operates on the belief that presenting academically informed opinions that promote peace and nonviolent conflict resolution provides the public one of the best, and most absent, deterrents to war and injustice.
  [www.peacevoice.info](http://www.peacevoice.info)

- **Peace Policy**
  A product of the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for Peace Studies, providing research-based insight, commentary, and solutions to the global challenge of violent conflict. Contributions include writing from scholars and practitioners working to understand the causes of violent conflict and seeking effective solutions and alternatives war and the use of force.
  [https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/](https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/)

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  [https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/](https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>OUR VISION</th>
<th>Our vision is a world beyond war by 2030 and humanity united by a global system of peace with justice.</th>
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<tr>
<td>OUR MISSION</td>
<td>Our mission is to advance the Global Peace System by supporting, developing and collaborating with peacebuilding efforts in all sectors of society.</td>
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| OUR CORE VALUES | Nonviolence – We promote strategic and principled nonviolent solutions over any kind of armed conflict.  
Empathy – We view social problems through the eyes of others and respectfully communicate with each other in the pursuit of mutual understanding.  
Planetary loyalty – We consider ourselves global citizens, living in harmony with humanity and nature.  
Moral imagination – We strive for a moral perception of the world in that we: (1) imagine people in a web of relationships including their enemies; (2) foster the understanding of others as an opportunity rather than a threat; (3) pursue the creative process as the wellspring that feeds the building of peace; and (4) risk stepping into the unknown landscape beyond violence. |

| WE SUPPORT | Support Rotary International’s focus on peace by aiding the Rotarian Action Group for Peace with human, logistical and content-related resources.  
Support development of effective strategies to convince Americans that the United States should not promote war, militarism or weapons proliferation, but rather embrace conflict resolution practices that have been shown to prevent, shorten, and eliminate war as viable alternatives to local, regional and global conflicts.  
Support building grassroots social movements seeking a world beyond war. |

| WE EDUCATE | Actively contribute to peace science and public scholarship on war prevention issues.  
Share information and resources with multiple constituencies in an understandable manner.  
Provide evidence-based information on peace and conflict issues with immediately potential doable policy advice to public policy makers.  
Advance the understanding and growth of the Global Peace System. |

| WE ENGAGE | Convene national and international experts in ongoing constructive dialog on war prevention issues via our Parkdale Peace Gatherings.  
Connect likely and unlikely allies to create new opportunities.  
Participate in peacebuilding networks and membership organizations. |

| UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS | We are at a stage in human history where we can say with confidence that there are better and more effective alternatives to war and violence.  
A Global Peace System is evolving.  
Poverty, employment, energy, education, the environment and other social and natural factors are interconnected in peacebuilding.  
Peace Science and Peace Education provide a path to a more just and peaceful world.  
Multi-track diplomacy offers a sectoral framework for creating peacebuilding opportunities. |