Peacekeepers with the ability to enforce peace agreements are better able to build norms of trust and cooperation compared to the absence of peacekeepers.
An increase in manufacturing increases the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns. As countries continue to modernize, social conflict manifests nonviolently.
National and local peace initiatives are mutually influential. The success of one increases the chances of success in the other.
Peace agreements mediated with credibility leverage last over twice as long compared to agreements without credibility leverage.
Moderate sanctions lower the chance of war, but weak/overly destructive sanctions do the opposite. Strategic sanctions can lead to diplomatic negotiations.
Repressing religious freedoms is twice as likely to cause terrorism than a country’s high poverty rate or population size.
Countries are more likely to experience the onset of nonviolent campaigns when there is a greater amount of mobilization globally.
Using sunk costs to justify an ongoing war does not work—the U.S. public doesn’t support the ‘Don’t Let Them Die in Vain’ argument.
A country ranked at the bottom 10% on a global poverty scale is six times more likely to see violent civil conflict than a country at the top 10%.
Alliances are a necessary condition for multiparty wars; the larger the war, the more likely alliances are a necessary condition.